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Nowadays most of our sensitive information is accessible through web browsers. Securing these 
systems is of great concern, because any web accessible system is continuously exposed to threats. 
Internet, despite its important role in our lives today, is suffering from many drawbacks such as 
threats to confidential information, scam, fraud and even endangering users‟ systems in the extreme.  
 
Among the major concerns of large companies and private users regarding rogue java applets are 
destruction, modification and theft of their confidential documents. According to a Symantec 
Internet Security Threat Report there has been an overall increase in threats to confidential 
information. According to another Symantec Internet Security report published in October 2009 
vulnerabilities in the Web browsers and Web browser plug-ins are causing attacks, attempting to gain 
access to a user system. 
 
 In this paper the basic security features of the Java platform, especially the Java Sandbox model 
security issues are discussed. Java Security Model (Sandbox) is one of the first and most popular 
security models that can be integrated into the Web browsers in order to prevent applets from doing 
anything destructive to the host system. Our ambition is ultimately to prove that the Java Sandbox 
Model is really secure, reliable and trustworthy security architecture. 
  
The thesis is concluded by the findings that surely the Java Sandbox model provides mechanisms that 
can protect users‟ confidential information from being stolen, deleted, modified and any other 
destructive external threads. The Sandbox model allows the users to take advantages of ad-hoc 
applications while it surrounds the running application to protect users‟ system from malicious codes. 
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1 Introduction and Background 
 
 
This chapter begins with a brief introduction; Problem Discussion concentrates which will help 
the reader to understand the insight of the research area, followed by description of the 
background of the selected area. The background description ends with research problems and 
specific research questions. Finally the methodology employed is presented. 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Internet is a technology that spreads faster than any other technology in the world and thus it 
has become part of our life. As nowadays most of our sensitive information is accessible 
through web browsers, securing these systems is of great concern, because there is a potential 
risk of attack to any computer hooks to networks. The risk is vast in an environment in which 
the software is downloaded across the network and executed locally as this is the case with the 
java applets.  Applets are automatically (an applet may not give any visual signal of its 
existence or execution) downloaded across the network and run on the host machine when a 
user accesses in a browser a web page containing applet. A user coming across malicious 
applets is within the realms of possibility. 
 
The Java Sandbox model provides you an environment, where you could welcome any code 
from any source. But when the code from an untrusted source runs Sandbox restricts the code 
from taking any actions that could possibly harm your system. It terms of applets the 
restrictions means that applets will be unable to determine information about each other; each 
applet is given its own memory space to run. 
 
Java has solved the problem of security and portability in advanced in this way that the output 
of a Java compiler is not executable code. It is the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) which helps to 
solve the major problems associated with downloading programs over Internet.  The fact that 
a Java program is interpreted into an intermediate language (byte-code) is a part of Java 
language security. Because the execution of every Java program comes under the control of 
JVM, the JVM prevent it from modifying sensitive information in the user machine and 
harming the user machine.  
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1.2 The Java Virtual Machine 
 
Java Virtual Machine (JVM) provides a safe place for Java programs (applets) to run in the 
world of the Internet. It is a machine inside a machine or it is machine at the heart of the Java 
platform. As matter of fact it is a machine that does not physically exist or there is no 
hardware implementation of this microprocessor available, but it exists only in the memory of 
our computers. Figure1 is an illustration the location of JVM. 
 
Physical Machine
Java Virtual 
Machine
 
Figure 1 JVM illustration 
 
The JVM has the main role to Java's portability because compiled Java programs run on the 
Java Virtual Machine. It is a platform-independent execution environment that converts Java 
byte code into machine language according to the operating system and executes it. It also 
allows you to run Java applets' inside your Web browser safely. 
1.3 What is an applet 
 
The introduction of Java applets has animated the development of World Wide Web and 
Internet applications. Before Java, HTML was only a static contents and World Wide Web 
was a read-only interface. The execution of applets in a browser while browsing web pages has 
made the browser to become the universal computer interface.  
 
Applets are small programs written in Java language that can be embedded into HTML pages.  
Applets can run in a WWW browser using JVM or applet viewer (applet viewer is a standalone 
application provided by Sun).  The Java applet is itself a fully functioning little program. They 
are designed to run inside a web browser and to perform some tasks such as animated 
graphics and interactive tools.  Applets are supported by most web browsers such as Mozilla 
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and internet explorer. Applets can be downloaded from the Internet and run safely within a 
web browser sometimes even without noticing them. 
 
1.3.1 How to embed an applet into a Web page 
 
A Java applet can be embedded into a Web page by a <APPLET> tag. The following piece of 
HTML code illustrates its use.  
  
        <APPLET code="SomeJavaCode.class" 
                width=300  
                height=300> 
        <PARAM name=input1 value="value1"> 
        <PARAM name=input2 value="value2"> 
        Your browser does not know how to exec Java applications. 
        </APPLET> 
 
The plain text inside <APPLET>, </APPLET> tags is displayed only in the browsers that 
do not support Java. Parameters can be delivered to Java applet by name/value pairs in the 
<PARAM> tag. (Michael Girdley, Kathryn A. Jones, quoted 20.01.2010) 
 
1.4 Why Software Developers Choose Java 
 
Java has been tested, refined, extended, and proven by a dedicated community [21]. Write 
software once in one platform and run it anywhere in any other platform is one of the most 
important key features of java language that makes java as the most powerful language and 
preferred language over other languages.  As a software developer or programmers you don‟t 
have to think or be concerned with how or where your software will run instead you can 
concentrate on writing the software.   Aside from being pre-eminent language of the Internet 
Java is a technology. Beside programming language it also is a development, an application 
and a deployment environment .As a programming language, Java can create all kinds of 
applications that you could create using any other programming language.  
 
Aside from its best features secure, portable, platform independent and distributable over a 
network, Java is also simple, garbage collected, portable and robust according to Sun java 
definition; thus it has become extremely important to developers.   
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1.4.1 Java is Safe  
 
Accepting the fact that there is no such thing as a 100-percent secure system, at least if we 
want that system to do anything useful. The security features within   the Java language want 
to ensure that a program will be unable to modify sensitive information that may reside in the 
memory of a user‟s machine. In terms of applets, these protections also mean that applets will 
be unable to determine information about each other; each applet is given, in an essence, its 
own memory space in which to operate.  In Java, objects cannot be directly manipulated by a 
programmer; instead, they can only be accessed through their public interfaces. Programmers 
cannot directly access memory either, but must use object references. This fact makes it much 
harder for a nasty program to search through memory looking for interesting data such as 
passwords and credit card numbers. 
 
It is hard to fix Vulnerabilities with security patches1. Security problems should therefore be 
identified early in a development process. Ad hoc solutions to security problems may create 
new vulnerabilities and new security hole. Thus security was in minds of developer while 
developing Java.  
 
1.5 Research Problem and Questions 
 
Security is a critical part of any application. It would be impossible for this project to address 
security factors from throughout the entire Java range. The project will be focussing only on 
the Java Sandbox security issues. Thus this leads the research to the following questions: 
 
1. How the sandbox protects our personal data and applications from external threats.  
 
2. How the java security feature especially sandbox will minimize the likelihood that 
hackers will not be able to manipulate applications and access, steal, modify, or delete 
sensitive data  
 
3. To investigate various security issues and options of Java sandbox. 
                                                 
1
 A patch is a piece of software designed to fix problems. (http://en.wikipedia.org) 
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1.6 Research Approach 
 
Although research on Java Sandbox security issues is not something new, because most of the 
concepts in this study have been examined before, but mostly in the Java Virtual Machine 
security concepts as whole, hence the aim is not to make any simplification, but instead to 
provide step-by step analysis of java sandbox security processes, which intends to provide us a 
deeper understanding of java sandbox security issues. 
 
My intention with this research is to describe and clarify, and find complete and detailed 
information about the security issues of the Java Sandbox. Thus to gain deeper understanding 
of the security issues in the Sandbox context, this research conducted as a qualitative study 
where focus lies on describing an event with the use of words. 
 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is divided in four chapters, namely Introduction and Background, Literature 
Review, Data Analysis and Conclusion. Chapter 1 gave an introduction and background to the 
topic, research problem and questions, and research approach are also described there. 
Chapter 2 presents literature review. It provides the relevant literature in the filed that I 
selected for my research.  Chapter 3 will analyze the data from preceding chapter. It will 
present the achieved results and the interpretation of results. Chapter 4 will bring the report to 
the end. It will present the conclusion of the study and summarizes the main findings of the 
research. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
 
The previous chapter provided the introduction and research problem and research objective. In 
this chapter I will present literature review. The aim of this chapter is to provide the relevant 
literature in the field that I selected for my research.  
 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
 
To identify and describe the Java Sandbox security issues, this background study involved 
reviewing numerous literatures related to security issues of the Java Sandbox. It was used to 
give me a broader understanding of the Sandbox security issues in different environments. I 
read and used many books, theses, pdf files, PowerPoint slides and articles like, Java security 
evolution and concepts by (Raghavan N. Srinivas, JavaWorld.com, 28/07/00), Inside the Java 
virtual machine by (Bill Venners, 1998), Java
TM
 2 Platform Security Architecture Version 1.2, 
by (Li Gong, java.sun.com, 2002), Securing Java by (Gary McGraw and Edward Felten) and 
many more about Java security from the net. 
 
Java is designed so that programs can be dynamically loaded over the network and run locally 
(Gary McGraw & Edward W. Felten, 37). Verifying a program‟s veracity before executing it is 
necessary, because malicious applets can steal or destroy information on user‟s machine. The 
Java Virtual Machine provides an environment where an untrusted application can be 
executed in a trusted environment. Discussion of Java‟s security model often centres on the 
idea of a sandbox model. The idea behind this model is that when you allow a program to be 
hosted on your computer, you want to provide an environment where the program can run, 
but you want to limit the program‟s play area within certain bounds. You may decide to let the 
program have access to certain system resources, but in general, you want to make sure that 
the program will not access local resources out of its sandbox. The essence of the sandbox 
model is that local code is trusted to have full access to vital system resources (such as the file 
system) while downloaded remote code (an applet) is not trusted and can access only the 
limited resources provided inside the sandbox. 
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2.2 Overview of Java Security Model 
 
Traditionally, you had to trust software before you ran it. You achieved security by being 
careful only to use software from trusted sources and by regularly scanning for viruses just to 
make sure. After some software got access to your system, it had full reign. If it was malicious, 
it could do a great deal of damage because no restrictions were placed on it by the run time 
environment of your computer. So in the traditional security scheme, you tried to prevent 
malicious code from ever gaining access to your computer in the first place. (Bill, Venners, 34-
35) 
 
Java has taken a pro-active approach .Java platform‟s security model known as the sandbox 
model makes it easier to work with software that comes from sources you don‟t fully trust. 
The main goals of sandbox security model are: to focus on protecting users from hostile 
programs and to reduce; for the naive users who just surf the web, the necessity of becoming 
security expert. To accomplish this goal, the model provides a very restricted environment in 
which to run untrusted code or software. The advantage of the sandbox model is that you 
don't need to figure out what code you can and can't trust. The sandbox itself prevents any 
viruses or other malicious code from doing any damage to your computer.  
  
Since the inception of Java sandbox model, the model has been extended and some significant 
new security features are available in the Java Development Kit (JDK) version 1.1 and 1.2 or 
java 2 platform security model. Since the Java sandbox model has been widely distributed to 
millions of users with their Web browsers, it is safe to say that the Java sandbox is today's 
most widely used sandbox (Gary McGraw and Edward W. Felten, 38).  Before going deep 
into details of java sandbox I will briefly explain the different versions of sandbox security 
issues.  
 
In order to remove confusion before jumping to more details: 
 
 JDK stands for Java Development Kit 
 SDK (JDK 1.2 was renamed SDK or Java 2 or Java 2 SDK)  stand for Software 
Development Kit 
 Don't confuse the JDK or SDK with the JRE (Java Runtime Environment). The JRE 
has everything needed for running Java programs, but does not have the tools needed 
for developing  Java programs for example the compiler. 
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2.2.1 JDK 1.0 security  
 
In the initial design of security model provided by the Java platform (Sandbox model) every 
single piece of code obtained from the open network was considered untrusted code. The 
model provided a very restricted environment to place untrusted code (applet).  The core of 
the sandbox model is that local code is fully trusted and had access to  all critical system 
resources for example  the file system, but downloaded remote code (an applet) is not trusted 
and can only have limited access.  Figure 2 is an illustration of the initial security architecture 
in JDK1.0 (Java Development Kit 1.0). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 JDK 1.0.x Security Model  (Li Gong, Marianne Mueller, Hemma Prafullchandra 
&Roland Schemers, 1997, 2) 
 
 
The initial sandbox model provides a kind of rough security control: local code is considered 
trusted and can have full access to the local system and remote code (applet) is untrusted and 
can have very limited access. 
  
 
9 
 
2.2.2 JDK 1.1 Security 
 
JDK 1.1 (Java Development Kit 1.1) introduced the concept of signed applet (Li Gong, 
Marianne Mueller, Hemma Prafullchandra, and Roland Schemers, 3).  Figure 3 is an 
illustration of the signed applets security architecture in JDK1.1. A digitally signed applet is 
treated like local code, with full access to resources, if the public key used to verify the 
signature is trusted. In JDk1.1 unsigned applets are run in the sandbox with the same 
restriction as in JDK1.0. Signed applets are delivered, with their respective signatures, in 
signed JAR (Java Archive) files (Li Gong, Marianne Mueller, Hemma Prafullchandra, and 
Roland Schemers, 3).   
  
The model is said to be too coarse (Michael Girdley & Kathryn A. Jones, quoted, 2.2.2010): 
End-user has only two options:  signed the applet to gives the applet additional privileges or 
unsigned the applet and consequently diminished the usability of the applet. Both options 
have their own drawbacks.  Signed applet is assumed to be safe or has come from a 
trustworthy source and given complete access to the local computing platform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 JDK1.1 Security Model (Li Gong, Marianne Mueller, Hemma Prafullchandra 
&Roland Schemers, 1997, 3) 
 
(Applet) 
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In JDK 1.0 and 1.1 local Java applications are fully trusted and therefore could run with full 
privileges. In fact local Java applications should not be given full access to all parts of the 
system, because they may also be a potential risk to the system. For example it is common in 
software development world that a software developer test or installs a demo of the developed 
program on the local system and then tries the program outside. The demo program could 
cause a potential damage to the underlying system. Thus, it is prudent to give these types of 
programs less than full access to the system.  
 
 
2.2.2.1 Signed Applets 
 
Suppose that a customer of a brokerage firm uses a stock-trading applet loaded from the 
brokerage‟s Web site. This customer may want to let the applet update local files that contain 
her stock portfolio. However, access to the client-side file system is prohibited by the sandbox 
model (JDK1.0). Thus, this customer needs flexible access control, whereby certain applets 
can have access that is outside the sandbox. With JDK 1.1, the brokerage firm could sign the 
trading applet, and, assuming that the customer configured her Java runtime to recognize the 
brokerage firm to be trusted signer, the applet could access resource outside the sandbox. (Li 
Gong, Gary Ellison & Mary Dageforde, 2003, 32, quoted 18.02.2010) 
 
However, the customer may have installed on her local desktop financial management 
software that handles income tax issues. She might not feel comfortable letting the brokerage 
firm‟s applet have free rein on her entire desktop system. In this case, it may be best to 
confine the applet to limited file system access, perhaps only to the brokerage firm‟s folder. 
What is needed is a model whereby the sandbox can be customized- for example, by the client 
system-to have flexible shapes and boundaries: in other words, fine-grained access control. (Li 
Gong, Gary Ellison & Mary Dageforde, 2003, 32, quoted 18.02.2010) 
 
 
When Sun Microsystems and the major browser companies switched from the simple sandbox 
security model to fine-grained access control based on signed code, they sometimes tried to 
give the impression that this would ”enhance” security. Code signing cryptographically binds a 
certain principal, such as an individual or company, to a piece of code. It is not feasible to 
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change a signed piece of code without being detected, nor is it possible to impersonate 
someone else by augmenting code with their signature. (Dirk Balfanz & Edward W. Felten, 3) 
 
With this technology in place, it is always possible to find out who signed the code. The 
argument goes that now users can decide that code signed by untrusted or unknown parties 
should be denied privileges. (Dirk Balfanz & Edward W. Felten, 3) 
 
However, the browser will still load “untrusted” code, the difference is only that the untrusted 
code will run with fewer privileges. Untrusted code is usually run within the old sandbox (i.e. 
no file system access, no network access except back to the originating host). But we have 
already seen that code can exploit implementation bugs and break out of that sandbox. Code 
signing provides no enhanced security at this point. (Dirk Balfanz & Edward W. Felten, 3) 
 
Even worse, code signing introduces new system code which can have2, and in fact has been 
found to have , new bugs that weren‟t there before. This opens even more doors for malicious 
applets. On the trade-off continuum between security and functionality, code signing belongs 
on the functionality side, as it can be used to provide fine grained access control and provides 
the user with information about who endorsed a specific piece of code. Code signing does not 
“enhance” security. (Dirk Balfanz & Edward W. Felten, 3) 
 
 Thus necessity for a new and unqualified approach had to be taken in consideration about 
Java security model. The Java developers had realized the necessity too and as a result the 
JDK 1.2 was released. 
 
2.2.3 Java 2 Security 
 
The release of JDK 1.2 has brought a number of improvements over JDK 1.1. In JDK 1.2 
every code, regardless of whether it is a local or remote (applet), can be under a security policy. 
As a user or a system administrator you could configure security policy to define different 
permission for different code from various signers or locations. Each permission specify a 
permitted access to a particular resource, such as read and write access to a specified file or 
directory or connect access to a given host and port. The runtime system organizes code into 
individual domains, each of which encloses a set of classes whose instances are granted the 
                                                 
2 www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/news/april29.html 
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same set of permissions. A domain can be configured to be equivalent to the sandbox, so 
applets can still be run in a restricted environment if the user or the administrator so chooses. 
Applications run unrestricted, as before, by default but can optionally be subject to a security 
policy. (Mary Dageforde, quoted 22.01.2010) 
 
 The new security architecture in JDK 1.2 is illustrated in the following figure (figure 4). The 
arrow on the left end refers to a domain whose code is granted full access to resources; the 
arrow on the right refers to the opposite extreme: a domain restricted exactly the same as the 
original sandbox. The domains in between have more accesses allowed than the sandbox but 
less than full access. (Mary Dageforde, quoted 22.01.2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 JDK1.2 Security Model (Mary Dageforde, Security in JDK1.2) 
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The new security architecture in SDK1.2 (the JDK has been renamed later and is now called a 
Software Development Kit (SDK), so we have the Java 2 SDK) let the users expand the 
original sandbox idea, create their own sandboxes, eliminate the sandbox entirely, and even 
the opportunity to run a java application (not applet) within a sandbox that the user or system 
administrator has constructed or configured.  
 
The Java 2 security architecture eliminates the need to write custom security cod for all but the 
most specialized environment, such as the military, which may require special security 
properties, such as multilevel security. Even then, writing custom security code is simpler and 
safer than before. (Li Gong, Gary Ellison & Mary Dageforde, 2003, 32, quoted 18.02.2010) 
 
 
The Java security architecture in SDK 1.2 is an expansion of the JDK 1.1 security model. 
Aside from other improved feature, the new security model allows configurable access 
controls for Java code. For better understanding of the new and improved security 
architecture in SDK 1.2, a more detailed explanation of improvement is needed. 
 
 Fine-grained access control 
 
Fine- grained access control is a mechanism of checking permissions before allowing access to 
certain protected system resources to increase system integrity. This capability existed in the 
JDK from the beginning (Li Gong, quoted 16.02.2010), but it was so much complicated to 
implement a more flexible and finer-grained access control on the Java platform. By sub 
classing and customizing the Security Manager and Class Loader the application writer had to 
accomplish this work.  Thus, the application developer had to have a very deep knowledge of 
computer and internet security in order to be able to customize such security-sensitive 
programming.  
 
 
 Easily configurable security policy 
 
Once again, this capability existed previously in the JDK but was not easy to use. Moreover, 
writing security code is not straightforward, so it is desirable to allow application builders and 
users to configure security policies without having to program (Li Gong, quoted 16.02.2010). 
Configuring security policy is easy in SDK 1.2; all you have to do is to edit the appropriate 
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policy configuration file.  SDK provides a number of ways to do this: by using either a text 
editor, command line or GUI tool. Configurable security policy of SDK 1.2 allows the users 
to specify a security policy for applets and applications and to have control over the access 
they allow to these programs based on their degree of trust in the source of the Java program 
they execute.  
 
 
 Easily extensible access control structure 
 
Prior to Java 2 SDK creating new access permission required adding new check method to the 
Security Manager class.  
 
For example, to check whether a file can be opened for reading, you would call the checkRead 
method on the currently installed Security Manager. Such a design is not easily extensible, 
because it does not accommodate the handling of new type of checks that are introduced as 
after-marked add-on to the Java runtime. It is also not scalable. For example, to create a new 
access check, such as one that check whether money can be withdrawn from a bank account, 
you would have to add a new checkAccountWithdraw method to the Security Manager class 
or one of its subclasses. Thousands of various kinds of checks are possible. If methods were 
created for this large a number, they would clutter the Security Manager class. In fact, because 
many checks are application specific, not of all them can be defined within the JDK. What is 
needed is an easily extensible access control structure. (Li Gong, Gary Ellison & Mary 
Dageforde, 2003, 33, quoted 18.02.2010) 
 
The new model (Java 2 SDK) does not require adding of new checks method to the security 
manager class; instead it looks into permissions in the policy file. The check permission 
method automatically handles all security checks. 
 
 
 Extension of security checks to all Java programs, including applets as well as 
applications 
 
Java application and signed applets are no longer fully trusted. Instead both local code and 
applets are treated equally and both are subjected to the same security control. If needed there 
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is a possibility to declare the policy on both local code or remote code (applet) as most trusted, 
thus the code will run as totally trusted. 
 
 Robust and simple Internal Security Mechanisms 
 
In JDK 1.0 and JDK 1.1, a number of internal security mechanisms were designed and 
implemented, using techniques that were rather fragile. Although they worked reasonably well, 
maintaining and extending them proved difficult. For Java 2, we made important internal 
structure adjustment to reduce the risk of creating subtle security holes in the Java runtime 
and application programs. This involved revising the design and implementation of the 
Security Manager and Class Loader classes, as well as the underlying access control mechanism. 
(Li Gong, Gary Ellison & Mary Dageforde, 2003, 34, quoted 18.02.2010) 
 
2.2.3.1 The Access Controller 
 
The release of SDK 1.2 (Java 2) introduced a new security policy-based class called Access 
Controller class which was not a part of the earlier versions. Access Controller is a much more 
simple and flexible mechanism for determining security policies. Access controller is the 
mechanism that the Security Manager actually uses to enforce its protections (Scott Oaks, 
1998, 90).  Access Controller gives the programmer the ability to check whether a user has the 
permission to perform a particular operation.  
 
Before the existence of the Access Controller the Security Manager was a self-reliance security 
component because security policy was as an internal logic of the Security Manager. The 
Security Manager had to rely on its internal logic to determine the security policy that should 
be in effect, and changing the security policy required changing the Security Manager itself 
(Scott Oaks, 1998, 90). Therefore, in the earlier versions of the Java sandbox, implementation 
of a customized security policy with the Security Manager alone was not impossible, but it was 
too hard to implement and needed much effort. Starting with Java 2 the Security Manager can 
defer to Access Controller on access-control decisions. 
 
Access Controller has brought flexibility in Security Manager for determining the security 
policy, because the policy needed to be enforced by the Security Manager can be specified in a 
file. Access Controller also provides a simple way of granting specific permission to a 
particular code. For back-ward-compatibility reason, the Java 2 API still calls the methods of 
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the Security Manger to enforce system security, but most of these methods call the 
AccessController (Marco Pistoia, Nataraj Nagaratnam, Larry Koved & Anthony Nadalin, 2004, 
274).  
2.3  Overview of Java 2 Security Architecture 
 
 
The new security architecture in Java 2 platform unlike earlier versions is policy-based and 
easily configurable architecture. The new mechanism provides the ability of granting specific 
permission to a specific system resource for a specific piece of code, in simple words a fine-
grained access control. As a Java system administrator you have the power to have control 
over any application, by defining what each application is permitted to do. For example giving 
read and write permission on a file (i.e. A), only read permission on another file (i.e. B) and no 
permission on another file (i.e. C), depending on who is the singer of the code and/or location 
of the code from where the code was loaded.   The new mechanism of Java 2 looks into the 
security policy in order to be able to decide on granting access permission to running code. 
The permissions based on the properties of the code, such as the origin of the code, who is 
running the code, signer of the code if signed and so on.  
 
Security checks is invoked by any attempt to access the protected resources, security check 
compares the granted permission with the one which is trying to access the resource. If access 
was not defined in the policy file, the default policy is the sandbox policy as implemented in 
JDK 1.0 and JDK 1.1. 
 
2.4 The Java Sandbox Architecture 
 
The Java sandbox exits in the memory of your machine outside the reach of Java programs. 
This prevents Java programs from being able to call low level system functions that may cause 
data corruption or other damages. The Java sandbox main job is to prevent malicious applets 
from accessing the resources in your machine. It applies several restrictions on the applets. 
The base Java Security sandbox is made of three major components: 
 
 the Class Loader 
 the byte code Verifier 
 the Security Manager 
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One of the greatest strengths of Java‟s security model is that two of these components, the 
class loader and the security manager, are customizable. By customizing these components, 
you can create a customized security policy for a Java application. As a developer, you never 
need to create your own customized sandbox. You can often make use of sandboxes created 
by others. When you write and run a Java applet, for example, you make use of a sandbox 
created by the developer of the web browser that hosts your applet. (Bill Venners, 45) 
 
 Each of the three components must work properly in order for Java to perform in a secure 
fashion. The Security Manager depends on Class Loaders to correctly label code as trusted or 
not trusted. Class Loaders also shield or protect the Security Manager from spoofing attacks 
by protecting local trusted classes making up the Java API. On the other hand, the class loader 
system is protected by the Security Manager, which ensures that an applet cannot create and 
use its own Class Loader. The Verifier protects both the Class Loaders and the Security 
Manager against language-based attacks meant to break the VM. All in all, the three parts 
strongly connected to create a default sandbox.  
 
In the past some thoughts referred to the Java security model as “three-layer” defence. The 
idea behind three layer defence was that if an applet succeed in crossing the first layer, there 
are still two other layers left to protect the system . In fact, the three parts of sandbox are 
dependent to each other tightly or tightly coupled. A bug in one of them could cause the 
entire security system to break.  
 
The Java sandbox is responsible for protecting a number of resources, and it does so at a 
number of levels. Consider the resources of a typical machine as shown in figure 5. The user's 
machine has access to many things (Scott Oaks, 1998, 4): 
 
 Internally, it has access to its local memory (the computer's RAM). 
 Externally, it has access to its file system and to other machines on the local network. 
 For running applets, it also has access to a web server, which may be on its local 
(private) net or may be on the Internet. 
 Data flows through this entire model, from the user's machine through the network 
and (possibly) to disk. 
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Figure 5  a machine has access to many resources (Scott Oaks, 1998, 5) 
 
Each of these resources needs to be protected, and those protections form the basis of Java's 
security model. We can imagine a number of different-sized sandboxes in which a Java 
program might run (Scott Oaks, 1998, 4-5): 
 
 A sandbox in which the program has access to the CPU, the screen, keyboard, and 
mouse, and to its own memory. This is the minimal sandbox -- it contains just enough 
resources for a program to run. 
 A sandbox in which the program has access to the CPU and its own memory as well 
as access to the web server from which it was loaded. This is often thought of as the 
default state for the sandbox. 
 A sandbox in which the program has access to the CPU, its memory, its web server, 
and to a set of program-specific resources (local files, local machines, etc.). A word-
processing program, for example, might have access to the docs directory on the local 
file system, but not to any other files. 
 An open sandbox, in which the program has access to whatever resources the host 
machine normally has access to.  
 
The sandbox then, is not a one-size-fits-all model. Expanding the boundaries of the sandbox 
is always based on the notion of trust: in some cases, I might trust Java programs to access my 
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file system; in other cases, I might trust them to access only part of my file system; and in still 
other cases, I might not trust them to access my file system at all. (Scott Oaks, 1998,  
5) 
 
2.4.1 The Class Loader 
 
The class loader is the first line of defence in Java security architecture. A class loader is an 
object that is responsible for loading or requesting classes, either from the web server or from 
the local system resources. It is the Class Loader, which gives Java its dynamic loading 
capabilities. The Class Loader is the part of the JVM that loads classes into memory or brings 
codes into the Java Virtual Machine. The class loader is important in Java‟s security model 
because initially, only the class loader knows certain information about the classes that have 
been loaded into the virtual machine (VM). Only the class loader knows where a particular 
class originated from.  Java's class loader architecture is complex, but it is a central security 
issue. The original Class Loader architecture was meant to be extensible, thus a new Class 
Loader could be added to the running system. So it was clear at the beginning that a malicious 
Class Loader could break Java‟s type system, and hence it could be contributed a breach in 
Java‟s security. As a result, Java implementation does not allow applets to create Class Loader. 
It is the class loader‟s responsibility to determine when and how classes can be added to a 
running Java environment.  
 
When the VM needs a byte code for a particular class, it request from a class loader (The VM 
knows which class loader to ask byte code from) to find and load the byte code for that 
particular class. It depends to the class loader to use its own method for finding requested 
byte code files: It can load them from the local resources, fetch them across the Net using any 
protocol, or it can just create the byte code on the spot. This flexibility is not a security 
problem as long as the class loader is a trusted object by the creator of the byte code that is 
being loaded. The class loaders also define the namespaces that be seen by different classes 
and how those namespaces relate to each other.  
 
Name-spaces contribute to security because you can place a shield between classes loaded into 
different name-spaces. Inside the Java Virtual Machine, classes in the same name-space can 
interact with one another directly. Classes in different name-spaces, however, can‟t even detect 
each other‟s presence unless you explicitly provide a mechanism that allows them to interact. 
(Bill Venners, 46) 
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2.4.1.1 Class Loader Types 
 
There are two basic varieties of class loaders: Primordial Class Loader and Class Loader 
Objects. There is only one Primordial Class Loader, which is an essential part of each Java 
Virtual Machine. It cannot be overridden. The Primordial Class Loader is involved in 
bootstrapping 3the Java environment. Since most VMs are written in C, it follows that the 
Primordial Class Loader is typically written in C. This special class loads trusted classes, usually 
from the local disk. (Gary McGraw and Edward W. Felten, 61) 
 
Class Loader objects load classes that are not needed to bootstrap the VM into a running Java 
environment. The VM treats classes loaded through Class loader objects as untrusted by 
default. Class Loaders are objects just like any other java objects- they are written in Java, 
compiled into byte code, and loaded by the VM (with the help of some other class loaders) 
These Class Loaders  give Java its dynamic loading capabilities. Figure 6 shows the inheritance 
hierarchy of Class Loader available in Java 2.  (Gary McGraw and Edward W. Felten, 62) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6 Class Loaders hierarchy (Gary McGraw & Edward W. Felten, 1999, 61) 
 
                                                 
3
 In computing, bootstrapping is a technique by which a simple computer program activates a more 
complicated system of programs. (www.wikipedia.org) 
 
Primordial Class Loader 
java.lang.ClassLoader 
java.security.SecureClassLoader 
AppletClassLoader 
java.net.URLClassLoader 
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2.4.1.2 Class Loaders of a Web Browser 
 
As indicated earlier that Class Loader is one of the customizable components of the Java 
Sandbox. It depends on the developer of a Web Browser, how to implement the class loader. 
A Web Browser is provided with two different class loaders: A class loader which has the 
responsibility to load class files over the network called Applet Class Loader and a class loader 
which loads class files from the local resources called System Class Loader. To every applet 
class loader assigns a private name-space and associated with the origin of the apple (The Java 
runtime can thus always determine the source of a given class and restrict the activities of the 
class accordingly (Lassi Lehto, quoted 20.01.2010), if the applets are from the same directory 
on a specific server class loader grouped them together in one name-space. To be able to 
maintain the trusted code separated from the untrusted code the Java runtime assigns a 
separate and unique name-space to all classes loaded from the local file system. 
 
While browsing on a web page if an applet is encountered, a new Applet class Loader is 
created for that applet to load the applet if it is the first applet from the same place on this 
web page. In case an Applet class Loader was created for another applet from the same place 
on the same page, that class loader can be used to load the applet. If the execution of a java 
bytecode requires presence of a method, a field or a new class (because if there is no need for 
loading these class material, they are not loaded during loading and verification), the class 
Loader is invoked to fetch the class materials(method, field or class file). The Class Loader will 
first try to fetch the class materials from the local file system, only if the class material is not 
found in the local resources; it will fetch the class material across the network from origin of 
the applet. 
 
Some criticism has been expressed because of the fact that every Web browser has its own 
implementation of the Java run time. Also critical security modules, like Applet Class Loader, 
have an individual implementation in each Java-enabled platform. Sun only provides a generic 
Class Loader to be extended as seen appropriate by each developer. The lack of central co-
ordination in the security related features of the Java platform has been regarded as a major 
vulnerability of the system. (Lassi Lehto, quoted 20.01.2010) 
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2.4.2 The Bytecode Verifier 
 
Despite the fact that Java compiler produces trustworthy class files and it makes sure that Java 
source code doesn't violate the safety rules, when an application such as the HotJava Browser 
imports a code fragment from anywhere, it doesn't actually know if code fragments follow 
Java language rules for safety: the code may not have been produced by a trustworthy Java 
compiler, but by some purposefully modified compiler for compromising the integrity of the 
Virtual Machine or the class file may have been change after the compilation process of Sun‟s 
compiler. In such a case, the Java run-time system on your machine can not trust the incoming 
bytecode stream.  The loaded class files, loaded by a Web browsers are not source code, which 
then can be compiled, they are already compiled codes. For these reasons all the Java Virtual 
Machine implementations have Byte Code Verifier. Thus, the Java run-time system subjects 
class files to bytecode verification process to make sure if the class files are safe to use or 
execute. Figure 7 is an illustration of Java bytecode control by the Bytecode Verifier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Control of Java bytecode 
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The illustration above shows the control of java Bytecode by the Bytecode Verifier .The 
important issue is that the Java class loader and the bytecode verifier make no assumptions 
about the primary source of the bytecode stream; the code may have come from the local 
system or from the internet which may have travelled halfway around the planet. The 
bytecode verifier ensures that code passed to the Java interpreter can be run without fear of 
breaking the Java interpreter. The Bytecode is not allowed to execute by any means until byte 
code passes through verification process or after it has passed the verifier's tests. 
 
 
The Byte Code Verifier enforces the loaded applet to follow the strict security rules set by the 
Java specifications. Although the Java language enforces restrictions on class files, but the 
Verifier make sure that the class is not changed after compilations process. The Verifier is 
built in to the VM and cannot be accessed by Java programmers or Java users. 
 
During the compilation process the Java source code is transformed to a platform 
independence machine code (byte code), which is not an executable code.  The byte code then 
stored in a class file and it is loaded to the Web browser by the Applet class loader. The byte 
code then is checked by the Byte Code Verifier; only after the byte code passes the Byte Code 
Verifier without any problems then it will be ready for execution.  
 
2.4.2.1 The Bytecode Verification Process 
 
The Bytecode verifier starts checking the class file as early as possible.  The performance takes 
place just after the class file is loaded. A class file is checked by the Bytecode verifier in four 
different levels or passes. The first three passes are internal checks of the Bytecode Verifier 
and the fourth pass is a runtime check or virtual pass where checking is done by appropriate 
Java Virtual Machine before execution. The verification passes are: 
 
1. Pass 1 occurs when the class is first read into the interpreter (Frank Yellin ,quoted 
2.2.2010).  In pass 1 in addition to verifying the Bytecode integrity the verifier makes 
sure that class file has a proper or basic format of a class file.  Proper format means 
that every class file‟s first four bytes must contain the right magic number: 
0XCAFEBABE and starts with the magic number. The purpose of magic numbers is 
to enable file parsers to easily recognize a certain type of file (Bill Venners, 46). All the 
attributes have a proper length is also checked in this pass. Proper length means that 
neither a class file is truncated nor it has extra bytes at the end. 
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2. Pass 2 starts after the class file is linked4. In this pass verifier explores the class file 
format a bit more. This time verification is done without looking at the Bytecode.  
 
The checks perform by this pass include the following (Tim Lindholm & Frank Yellin, 
1999, 141): 
 
 Ensuring that final classes are not subclassed and that final methods are not 
overridden. 
 Checking that every class (except object) has a direct supreclass. 
  Ensuring that the constant pool satisfies the document static constrains: for 
example, that each CONSTANT_Class_info structure in the constant pool 
contains in its name_index item a valid constant pool index for a 
CONSTANT_Utf8_info structure.  
 Checking that all filed references and method references in the constant pool 
have valid names, valid classes, and a valid type descriptor.  
 
Pass 2 checks only the well-formedness of the items. More detailed checking is done 
during Pass 3 and Pass 4. 
 
3. Pass 3 is the most complex pass of the Bytecode verification process. After the check 
for proper format and internal consistency in pass 1 and pass 2, the verifier turns its 
attention to the Bytecode. For better understanding of the Bytecode verifier, we 
should have some knowledge of bytecode and frames5. 
 
The bytecode streams that represent Java method are a series of on byte instruction, 
called opcodes, each of which can be followed by one or more operands. The 
operands supply extra data needed by the Java Virtual Machine to execute the opcode 
instruction. The activity of executing bytecode, one opcode after another, constitutes a 
thread of execution inside the Java Virtual Machine. Each thread is awarded its own 
Java Stack, which is made up of discrete frames. Each method invocation gets its own 
                                                 
4
 Linking is the process of taking a binary form of a class or interface type and combining it into the 
runtime state of the Java Virtual Machine, so that it can be executed. (Li Gong, quoted 2.2.2010) 
5
 A Java Virtual Machine frame is used to store data and partial results, as well as to perform dynamic 
linking, to return values for methods, and to dispatch exceptions. (Tim Lindholm & Frank Yellin, 71 ) 
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frame, a section of memory where it stores, among other things, local variables and 
intermediate results of computation. The part of the frame in which a method stores 
intermediate results is called the method‟s operand stack. An opcode and its (optional) 
operands may refer to the data stored on the operand stack or in the local variables of 
the method‟s frame. Thus, the virtual machine can use data on the operand stack, in 
the local variables, or both, in addition to any data stored as operands following an 
opcode when it executes the opcode. (Bill Venners, 51) 
 
In this pass bytecodes of each method are verified. Data-flow analysis is performed on 
each method. The verifier ensures that at any given point in the program, no matter 
what code path is taken to reach that point (Tim Lindholm & Frank Yellin, 1999, 142): 
 
 The stack is always the same size and contains the same types of objects.  
 No register is accessed unless it is known to contain a value of the appropriate 
type.  
 Methods are called with the appropriate arguments.  
 Fields are modified with values of the appropriate type.  
 All opcodes have appropriate type arguments on the stack and in the registers. 
 Variables are properly initialized (Gary McGraw & Edward W. Felten, 57) 
 
As indicated earlier, Pass 3 is the most complex pass of the Bytecode verification 
process. Hence the actual bytecod is verified in this pass. 
 
The code of each method is verified independently. First the bytes that make up the 
code are broken up into a sequence of instruction, and the index into the code array of 
the start of each instruction is replaced in an array. The verifier then goes through the 
code a second time and parses the instructions. During this pass a data structure is 
built to hold information about each Java virtual machine instruction in the method. 
The operand, if any, of each instruction are checked to make sure they are valid. (Tim 
Lindholm & Frank Yellin, 1999, 143) 
 
Pass 3 is a complex process that is carried out in two passes by Sun's Verifier. (Other 
vendors' Verifiers may behave differently.) The first pass identifies individual opcodes 
and stores them in a table. Once all opcodes are identified, the second pass parses 
each opcode's operands. During the second pass, a structure is built for each byte code 
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instruction. This structure is evaluated for syntactic correctness by checking that (Gary 
McGraw & Edward W. Felten, 57):  
 
 Flow control related instructions branch to valid instructions.  
 
 Local variable references are legal (associated with the proper method). 
  
 Use of constant pool entries follows typing rules.  
 
 Opcodes have the correct number of arguments.  
 
 Exception handler start and end with valid instructions, and the start point 
comes before the end point.  
 
These checks, along with data flow analysis that tracks behaviour of the operand stack 
and local variables, make up Pass 3. (Gary McGraw & Edward W. Felten, 57) 
 
4. Pass 4 occurs at run time. It performs some checks that were not done in pass 3 or 
delayed, for efficiency and implementation convenience, until the first time the code 
for the method is invoked. Some of these checks might have been impossible at 
verification time since some aspects of Java's type system cannot be statically checked, 
and some checks might have been deferred to runtime for implementation 
convenience (Gary McGraw & Edward W. Felten, 1999, 57).  Unless it is necessary 
pass 3 avoid loading class file, but pass 4 makes sure that reference method or field 
exits in the given class if not they are loaded in this pass. 
 
For example, if a method invokes another method that returns an instance of class A, 
and that instance is assigned only to a filed of the same type, the verifier does not 
bother to check if the class A is actually exists. However, if it is assigned to a field of 
the type B, the definitions of both A and B must be loaded in to ensure that A is a 
subclass of B. (Tim Lindholm &Frank Yellin, 1999, 142) 
 
Pass 4 is a virtual pass whose checking is done by the appropriate Java Virtual 
Machine instructions. The first time an instruction that references a type is executed, 
the executing instruction does the following: 
  
 
27 
 
 Load in the definition of the referenced type if it has not already been loaded. 
 Checks that the currently executing type is allowed to reference the type. 
 
The first time an instruction invokes a method, or accesses or modifies a field, the 
executing instruction does the following (Tim Lindholm & Frank Yellin, 142- 143): 
 
 Ensure that the referenced method or field exists in the given class. 
 Checks that the referenced method or field has the indicated descriptor. 
 Checks that the currently executing method has access to the referenced method 
or field.   
 
Once byte code passes through verification, the following things are guaranteed ( Gary 
McGraw and Edward W. Felten, 55):  
 
 The class file has the correct format, including the magic number (0xCAFEBABE) 
and proper length  
 Stacks will not be overflowed or underflowed  
 Byte code instructions all have parameters of the correct type. For example, integers 
are always used as integers and nothing else  
 No illegal data conversions (casts) occur. For example, treating an integer as a pointer 
is not allowed.  
 Private, public, protected, and default accesses are legal. In other words, no improper 
access to restricted classes, interfaces, variables, and methods will be allowed.  
 All register accesses and stores are valid.  
 
After the excruciating test of the Bytecode verifier on the Bytecode, the Java interpreter can 
proceed, knowing that the code will run securely. Being sure about the secure execution of 
Bytecode makes the Java interpreter much faster, because it doesn't have to check anything. 
The interpreter can thus function at full speed without fear. 
 
The important thing is not what the source code looked like or even what language it was 
written in, but what the byte code (the executable code) does.  The Byte Code Verifier also 
insures that loaded class files have a proper internal structure. Verifier acts as the primary 
gatekeeper in the Java security model. In case it finds out something wrong in a class file, it 
throws an exception, loading ceases, and the class file never executes. This is obviously a 
  
 
28 
 
much more reasonable behaviour than running buggy or malicious code that crashes the VM. 
In order for the Verifier to succeed in its role as gatekeeper, the Java runtime system must be 
correctly implemented. Bugs in the runtime system will make byte code verification useless. 
 
Sun‟s class file verifier is independent of any compiler. It should certify all code generated by 
Sun‟s compiler for the Java programming language; it should also certify code that other 
compilers can generate, as well as code that the current compiler could not possibly generate. 
Any class file that satisfies the structural criteria and static constrains will be certified by the 
verifier.  (Tim Lindholm & Frank Yellin, 140-141) 
 
The class file verifier is also independent of the Java programming language. Programs written 
in other languages can be compiled into the class file format, but will pass verification only if 
all the same constraints are satisfied. (Tim Lindholm, Frank &ellin, 141) 
 
The Verifier disallows many obvious approaches to byte code manipulation. Nonetheless, a 
number of researchers have succeeded in creating byte code that should be illegal, but 
nevertheless passes the Verifier. The Princeton Secure Internet Programming team was the 
first to sneak attacks involving illegal byte code past the Verifiers. Mark LaDue, creator of the 
Hostile Applet Home Page (www.rstcorp.com/hostile-applets), performs a number of 
interesting experiments in which he creates byte code that does not play by the rules and yet 
passes verification. Other Java security researchers, most notably the Kimera group at the 
University of Washington, have discovered problems in commercial Verifiers. Their work 
places special emphasis on correct verification.  
 
Java users and business people investigating the use of Java in their commercial enterprises 
often complain about the length of time it takes for a Java applet to get started running in a 
browser. E-commerce system designers paint start up delay as a business-side show stopper, 
citing the fact that consumers do not react well even to a 20-second delay in their shopping 
experience. Many people believe falsely that the main delay in starting applets is the time it 
takes to download the applet itself. But given a reasonably fast connection to the Internet, 
what takes the longest is not downloading the code, but verifying it. The inherent costs of 
verification fit the classic trade-off between functionality and security to a tee. As security 
researchers, we believe the security that byte code verification provides is well worth the slight 
delay. We also think it is possible to speed up the verification process so that its execution 
time is acceptable. (Gary McGraw and Edward W. Felten, 53).   
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2.4.3 The Security Manager 
 
Security Manager is one the most important component of the Java Sandbox. Class Loader 
and bytecode Verifier are a part of Java Virtual Machine internal security: Class Loader 
prevents code loaded by different class loaders from interfering with one another inside the 
Java Virtual Machine and Verifier ensures that the code passed to Java interpreter can not 
break the Interpreter. Security Manager protects the resources external to the Java Virtual 
Machine. The security Manager defines the boundaries of the sandbox. The Java API 
(Application Programming Interface) refers to the security manager before it allows any access 
to the resource. The final decision, whether a particular operation is allowed or not, is done by 
the Security Manager. Because the Security Manager is one of the customizable components 
of the Sandbox, it lets you to define a custom security policy for an application. 
 
The Java API enforces the custom security policy by asking the Security Manager for 
permission before it takes any action that is potentially unsafe. For each potentially unsafe 
action, the Security Manager has a method that defines whether that action is allowed by the 
Sandbox. Each method's name starts with check, so, for example, checkRead () defines whether 
a thread is allowed to read to a specified file, and checkWrite () defines whether a thread is 
allowed to write to a specified file. (Bill Venners, 58) 
 
All methods in the Java API that can access resources outside of the Java environment call a 
Security Manager method to ask permission before doing anything. If the Security Manager 
method throws a SecurityException, the exception is thrown out of the calling method, and 
access to the resource is denied. The Security Manager class defines a number of methods for 
asking for permission to access specific resources. Each of these methods has a name that 
begins with the word "check." Table 2.1 shows the names of the check methods provided by 
the Security Manager class. (Mark Grand & Jonathan Knudsen, quoted 11.02.2010) 
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Table 1 The Check Methods of Security Manager (Mark Grand & Jonathan Knudsen, 1997) 
 
Method Name Permission 
checkAccept() To accept a network connection 
checkAccess() To modify a Thread or ThreadGroup 
checkAwtEventQueueAccess() To access the AWT event queue 
checkConnect() 
To establish a network connection or send a 
datagram 
checkCreateClassLoader() To create a ClassLoader object 
checkDelete() To delete a file 
checkExec() To call an external program 
checkExit() 
To stop the Java virtual machine and exit the 
Java environment 
checkLink() 
To dynamically link an external library into 
the Java environment 
checkListen() To listen for a network connection 
checkMemberAccess() To access the members of a class 
checkMulticast() To use a multicast connection 
checkPackageAccess() To access the classes in a package 
checkPackageDefinition() To define classes in a package 
checkPrintJobAccess() To initiate a print job request 
  
 
31 
 
checkPropertiesAccess() 
To get or set the Properties object that 
defines all of the system properties 
checkPropertyAccess() 
To get or set a system property or Checks if 
the System properties can be accessed. 
checkRead() To read from a file or input stream 
checkSecurityAccess() To perform a security action 
checkSetFactory() 
To set a factory class that determines classes 
to be used for managing network 
connections and their content 
checkSystemClipboardAccess() To access the system clipboard 
checkTopLevelWindow() To create a top-level window on the screen 
checkWrite() To write to a file or output stream 
 
The Security Manager class in the java.lang package is an abstract class that provides the 
programming interface and partial implementation for all Java security managers. Each Java 
application can have its own security manager object that acts as a full-time security guard.  
 
Each VM can have only one Security Manager installed at a time, and once a Security Manager 
has been installed it cannot be uninstalled (except by restarting the VM). Java-enabled 
applications such as Web browsers install a Security Manager as part of their initialization, thus 
locking in the Security Manager before any potentially untrusted code or applets has a chance 
to run. (Gary McGraw and Edward W. Felten, 69) 
 
Other kinds of applications (local applications) normally run without a security manager, 
unless the application itself defines one.  To apply the same security policy to an application 
found on the local file system as to downloaded applets, either the user running the 
application must invoke the Java Virtual Machine with the new "-Djava.security.manager" 
command-line argument (which sets the value of the java.security.manager property), as in 
java -Djava.security.manager  SomeApp or the application itself must call the 
setSecurityManager method in the java.lang.System class to install a security manager. 
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 In a nutshell Java Security Manager prevents Java applets from accessing your local disk or 
local network. If an application or applet tries to access something outside of the sandbox 
without permission, Security Manager throws security exceptions. The checkPermission 
(java.security.Permission) method determines whether a request should be granted or an 
exception thrown. The job of the Security Manager is to keep track of who is allowed to do 
which dangerous operations. It is ultimately up to the security manager to determine whether 
a particular operation should be permitted or rejected. For example if a java program attempts 
to open a file, the security manager decides whether or not that operation should be permitted. 
If a java program wants to connect to a particular machine on the network, it must first ask 
permission of the security manager.  
 
It's the security manager which prevents applets from the reading and writing of files, prevents 
the deletion or creation of files and prevents access to other computers. The security manager 
really allows applets to do only four things: They can run, they can access the screen, they can 
accept input and they can connect back to their originating host.  
 
Most of the activities that are regulated by a "check" method are as follows. The classes of the 
Java API check with the security manager before they  (Bill Venners, 58): 
 
 Accept a socket connection from a specified host and port number  
 Modify a thread (change its priority, stop it, and so on)  
 Open a socket connection to a specified host and port number  
 Create a new class loader  
 Delete a specified file  
 Create a new process  
 Cause the application to exit  
 Load a dynamic library that contains native methods  
 Wait for a connection on a specified local port number  
 Load a class from a specified package (used by class loaders)  
 Add a new class to a specified package (used by class loaders)  
 Access or modify system properties  
 Access a specified system property  
 Read from a specified file  
 Write to a specified file  
 
  
 
33 
 
Because the Java API always checks with the security manager before it performs any of the 
activities listed above, the Java API will not perform any action forbidden under the security 
policy established by the security manager. (Bill Venners, 59) 
 
2.4.3.1 Security Manager and Access Controller 
 
The coming of Access Controller into existence in Java 2 has brought a big change into the 
role of the Security Manager. Before the existence of the Access Controller the Security 
Manager was a self-reliance security component and had to rely on it own internal logic. Now 
(after the release of Java 2), the Security Manager defer to Access Controller on access-control 
decisions. 
 
However, the security Manager has still remained an important component in the Java 
Security Architecture. For enforcing system security the Java API still calls the methods of 
Security Manager but most of these methods of the security Manager call the 
AccessController.  Thus, without existence of the Security Manager the Java API can never 
call the AccessController.  The reason behind these method calls is upward compatibility. 
 
For example, if you wrote a 1.1-based security manager that implements your desired security 
policy, you can still use that security manage with Java 1.2, your program will run exactly the 
same as it used to. In this case, you needn‟t worry about policy files and code sources and 
secure class loaders- the security model that you‟ve already encapsulated into your security 
manger will b e respected. (Scott Oak, 1998, 125) 
 
Unless the access controller is called it will not be initialized, but if it is called directly for a 
program-specific resource, it will automatically initialize itself. By default access controller will 
not be used by any Java application, because Java applications run without Security Manager 
by default. 
 
Even though newly written library code could enforce access-control decisions by directly 
calling AccessController.checkPermission (  ), this is not considered to be a good programming 
choice. SecurityManager.checkPermission(  ) should always be the primary interface between 
programs and AccessController.checkPermission (  ), for several reasons (Marco Pistoia, 
Nataraj Nagaratnam, Larry Koved & Anthony Nadalin, 2004, 274): 
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 The AccessController implementation may change in future Java release. By sticking 
to the SecurityManager‟s methods, programmers know that their code will not break. 
 
 The SecurityManager can be made active from the command line; the 
AccessController cannot. As a consequence, an application can be run without an 
active SecurityManager, but security would still be partially enforced if 
AccessController.checkPermission( ) were invoked directly. This could lead to 
inconsistent security enforcements. 
 
 
 Once it has been set as the system‟s current SecurityManager, a SecurityManager 
instance becomes the unique SecurityManager for the entire JVM system. This 
instance can, however, be replaced with a different SecurityManager instance by 
programs that are authorized to do so. A change in the active SecurityManager may 
imply a change in the measure the security policy is enforced; a new SecurityManager 
could be, in spite of the security policy, stricter that than the previous one, by denying 
specific Permissions, or more relaxed, by allowing other Permission. If some library 
code calls AccessController.CheckPermission( ) directly, without using 
SecurityManager.checkPermission(  ) as an interface, a change in the SecurityManager will 
inconsistently reflect in a corresponding change in the policy enforcement. 
  
2.4.3.2 Security Manager of a Web Browser 
 
Security Manager is one of the customizable components of the Java Sandbox. In a Web 
Browser Implementation of a Security Manager is much more critical than implementation of 
a Class Loader, because after all it is the Security Manager, which allows or disallows access to 
critical system resources. A Web Browser developer defines and implements a security policy 
for downloaded bytecodes. Thus, a Web Browser has a very important role in the security of a 
system.  
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3  Data Analysis 
 
 
In this chapter according to the methodology I have chosen the data will be analyzed and 
presented. At first, a brief explanation of malicious attacks types will be presented. Then the 
analysis of Java Security model for local and remote code (applet) will be done in two parts. In 
the first part, the design of Java Security Model will be discussed. In the second part, the 
adequacy and validity of the Java Sandbox against types of attacks, from malicious applet or 
programs can occur, will be discussed. 
 
3.1 Threats of Malicious Codes 
 
Malicious code is unlike viruses (the execution of a virus requires a user) is an auto-executable 
internet program. A malicious code is any code which will allow unauthorized access to the 
system, destroy, modify or steal data, damage a system and do something without the 
intention of a system user. It may not give any visual signal of its existence or execution to the 
victim. It can be written as any types of auto-executable content such as Java Applets. 
Malicious code does not replicate like viruses does, but the damage it brings to the system is 
an immediate damage. The main aim of programmers who intend to use malicious code is to 
gain access to files in a system or computer. It is also not far from the truth that sometimes 
the attacker may try to erase the system logs after doing something bad to the system in order 
to hide his/her footprint. Thus, it makes it sometime almost impossible to find who did 
something wrong to your system. 
 
Threats or attacks are classified into different numbers of categories in different computer 
security literature that I have come across. My intention is not to find out the correct number 
of categories, but rather to briefly explain some of them with the types of problems that can 
arise from them. Categories of attacks are: Integrity Attacks, Availability Attacks (it is also 
called as denial-of -service Attacks) and Secrecy Attacks (in some other places it is called 
Disclosure Attacks).  It is not intended to provide the complete list of all the potential attacks, 
but rather to give a flavour of some sample problems that can arise from them. 
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 Integrity Attacks 
 
The attacker tries to delete, alter or modify the files or a part of the system in unauthorized 
way. The attack could also include modification of the current memory in use and killing of 
the processes or threads. 
 
 For example a college student breaks into the collage administration system to raise her 
examination score, thus, compromising data integrity. An attacker might also try to erase 
system logs in order to hide his footprint. (Li Gong, Gary Ellison & Mary Dageforde, 2003, 3). 
 
 
 Secrecy Attacks 
 
 The attacker attempts to send personal or company files or mailing information of a host 
machine to someone or competitor over the network. The attacker may also try to steal 
confidential information such as password, medical records, email logs and etc. The methods 
of attack vary, from bribing the security guard to exploiting a security hole in the system or a 
weakness in the cryptography of algorithm (Li Gong, Gary Ellison & Mary Dageforde, 2003, 
3). 
 
 
 Availability Attacks 
 
The attacker tries to prevent the intended user from accessing a computer resource by 
disrupting the normal operation of a system. These attacks are also called as denial-of-service 
attacks. The attacker or java applet can accomplish these attacks in any number of ways for 
example by allocating all available memory, by creating thousands of windows or by creating 
high priority processes or threads. 
 
For example, bombarding a machine with a large number of IP (Internet Protocol) packets 
can effectively isolate the machine from rest of the network. A cyber terrorist might attempt 
to bring down the national power grid or cause traffic accidents by compromising the 
computer-operated control system. (Li Gong, Gary Ellison & Mary Dageforde, 2003, 3).   
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These categories of attacks are somehow related to each other in a very complicated way, 
because a successful attack in one category could assist attacker to attempt another attack. For 
example if an attacker could get a password by performing the secrecy attack, by using the 
password the attacker could access and alter the system which is an integrity attack and 
modifying system resources could lead to an availability attack or denial-of- service attack. 
  
3.2 Design of Java Security Model  
 
One of the most important parts of creating a safe environment for auto-executable content 
to be executed in is to identify the system resource and then to provide a simple way of 
granting limited access to these resources. Because, it would be impossible for a system, with a 
security policy in which an unknown program will have full access to all system resources, to 
survive in today‟s world.  
 
Designers of the Java have been well aware of executable content or mobile code risks. Thus, 
while developing Java security was considered as part of the Java‟s design. It is important to 
know that unlike many computer and network systems (security through obscurity), Java 
security model with all the details was published when the model was released. The sandbox 
model design specification and full resource implementation was included in the publication. 
The purpose has been to encourage security researchers to examine the model and report the 
security flaws before it becomes a victim of an attack. When Java technology is available 
within an operating system, such as Solaris, Linux, or Windows, its presence does not alter the 
basic security characteristics of the underlying system (Li Gong, Gary Ellison and Mary 
Dageforde, 2003, 21). 
 
  I should remind you that Java security architecture is intended for both local and remote cod 
(applet) that are executed by Java enabled Web Browser. But my intention here is discussion 
of Java Security Mechanism for remote code or auto-executable content. 
 
The design of Sandbox for remote codes (applets) is to have a Java enabled Web Browser. 
The embedded Java security model in Web Browsers allows a user to download and run 
applets (remote code or auto-executable content) either from the World Wide Web or from an 
intranet without risking user‟s machine. The Java Security mechanism confines the applet‟s 
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action to its sandbox: a dedicated area to that applet inside the Web Browser. The applet is 
allowed to do anything inside its sandbox, but not outside of the sandbox such reading, 
writing or modifying of data. 
 
3.2.1 Is Java Bytecode Enhancing Security? 
 
Bytecode is an intermediate code or language of a Java program, which is generated by Java 
compiler from the native code for the Java Virtual Machine. A Java program is compiled only 
once and it is transformed to bytecode which is a machine independent code, thus it can be 
run by Java interpreter on any platform or machine that has a Java interpreter.  
 
There are a number of possible reasons why the Java developer has chosen using bytecode 
instead of source code or native code. Reasons include portability, security and size, but the 
main concern has been security. 
 
Some criticism exists on portability, security and speed of the bytecode. If there is a possibility 
of portability with the java source code then why bytecode should be used instead. And if the 
Java source code was used instead of the bytecode the system would have been more secure. 
The speed of the process would have been also faster if the Java source code was used. Some 
people believe there is a delay in downloading the bytecode and some other believe that the 
delay is in verification process of the bytecode (if the Java source code was used instead there 
were no verification process, because the Java compiler is already trusted).  
 
 One of the problems with the Java Source code is the Java compiler. A compiler is a complex 
program. In today‟s world there are many computer platforms or computer types and day by 
day increasing in numbers, writing a new compiler for new platforms would need much effort 
On the other hand, an Interpreter is relatively small and simple program. Thus, writing an 
interpreter for a new platform wouldn‟t need much effort. It is important to know that there is 
no relative connection between Java and Java bytecode. Programs that are written in other 
languages can be compiled into Java bytecode. 
 
For security reason the Java security model prevent loaded applets from taking any destructive 
action by disallowing any potentially dangerous operation of the applets. Before allowing the 
code to be run the verifier examines the code for any attempt of bypassing security. The 
verifier checks the internal consistency of the data: code that manipulates a data item as an 
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integer at one stage and then tries to use it as a pointer later will be caught and prevented from 
executing (Hank Shiffman, quoted 12.02.2010). Since the Java language does not allow pointer 
arithmetic, so it is not possible to do what is just described with the Java code. It is also not far 
from the truth that someone could write malicious or destructive bytecode by using a 
hexadecimal editor or even by some purposefully modified compiler. In general analyzing 
machine code of a program before execution and determining whether the program does 
anything destructive would be impossible, because there are some programming-tricks in 
which the destructive action of the program may appear while executing. For example self-
modifying code is a code which changes its own instructions during the execution time. But 
Java byte code was designed for this kind of validation: it doesn't have the instructions a 
malicious programmer would use to hide their assault (Hank Shiffman, quoted 12.02.2010). 
 
Even though there might be slight delay in either downloading or verifying of the bytecode, 
but the security bytecode provides is worth the slight delay.  As a security researcher if I had 
made a simple questioner and asking people only one question: do you prefer security to speed 
or speed to security? There is no room for doubt that I would have got all the answer in 
favour of the security. 
 
3.2.2 Turning off Java 
 
Another very useful and important security feature of Java design is that it allows users to 
disable or switch off Java support in Web Browsers. Whenever users try to surf a web page, 
they don‟t fully trust or they don‟t know about the security problems related to that specific 
page, it is a recommendation to disable or switch off Java support in the Web Brower before 
surfing the site. This is one way of protecting web surfers from malicious applets, but it is not 
a satisfactory solution.   Disabling Java could also eliminate some of very annoying popup 
windows of advertisements, which exploit the default settings of Java permissions. It is also 
recommended to switch off Java support in Web Browser, whenever there is a new security 
hole found in Java system until the bug is fixed. Thus, it is an effective way of protecting 
user‟s system or machine: the effectiveness of disabling Java support in a Web Brower is that 
the Java applets will not be fetched from across the network and install on the user‟s machine. 
Therefore a malicious code or applet could not cause any harm to the users‟ machine. 
 
On the other hand switching off Java support in a Web Browser has some important side-
effects and will deprive companies and private users of many of the advantages of the Java 
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platform. Although it is an effective way of protection against malicious codes or applets, but 
switching off Java support is not an effective solution for someone who uses Java technology 
in their intranets.  For example some companies find Java applet technology very useful and 
use this technology within the intranet of the company for different purposes. These apples 
are written and use within the company, thus, they are trusted applets. But a great number of 
applets exist out there on the Internet, written with intentions that might be a sign of danger 
for the company. Consider if a company thinks that there are potential risks associated with 
the Java applets and decides to deploy an effective method against them, unfortunately this 
deployment would also affect useful Java technology altogether. 
 
Fortunately some solutions exist out there for what was just described above. For example the 
solution from the Princeton‟s Secure Internet Programming team of Princeton University 
called Java Filter. 
 
The Java Filter gives effective protection against unwanted execution of Java applets, without 
having to switch off Java support of your browser. For example, you could only allow applets 
from within your firewall onto your computer. (The Java Filter, quoted 01.03.2010)  
 
3.3 Implementation of Java Security Model  
 
In providing a safe environment for an auto- executable content, it is necessary to implement 
restrictions on host‟s system resources. In order to analyze the effectiveness of Java Security 
Model implementation in an effective way, it is necessary to find out whether there are 
adequate methods in the security model for controlling host‟s system resources such as file 
system, network, input devices (Mouse, Keyboard, Web Cam, etc), output device ( Monitor, 
Sound Card, Speakers, Video Card, etc), random memory, and etc. No restriction on these 
system resources means there is a possibility for all types of attacks mentioned in section 3.1. 
The list of system resource just mentioned is not intended to be complete in terms of all 
possible attacks, but to give an example of types of attacks associated with every system 
resource. For example all types of attacks mentioned in section 3.1 are associated with file 
system. It means if there is no restriction on file system there is a possibility for all types of 
attacks. And if there is no restriction on network the secrecy attack might happen and as 
mentioned in section 3.1 these categories of attacks are somehow related to each other: A 
successful attack in one category could assist attacker to attempt another attack. 
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To understand the theory well, it is necessary to look at the some of the host‟s machine system 
resources in more detail with the types of problems associated with the availability of these 
resources and to loot at the Java Security Model if there are adequate methods for controlling 
these resources of the host machine. The resource names is not intended to be complete, but 
to provide you some example of the problems related to these resources and Java Security 
Model solutions for these problems. 
 
File System -  A policy with no restriction to the file system on all programs 
would be unacceptable to everyone, because then there is no 
protection of users‟ privacy.  Attacking a system would not need 
much effort then. For example, if applets (remote code) had been 
give the permission to access the files on a user‟s machine, then 
writing an applet to destroy all the data on user‟s machine that 
downloaded the applet, would not be so difficult.  Thus, all types 
of attacks mentioned in section 3.1 could be easily happened to a 
system. 
  
 Java Security Model does not give access permission for untrusted 
applets to the file system on host system or machine. Security 
Manager of Java Security Model provides specific checks for read 
and write to a particular file. Thus, access to the file system on 
client machine is well protected. Applets therefore cannot read, 
write, or alter the properties (checkpropertyAccess ( ) method of 
Security Manager checks if the system property can be accessed) 
of any files on a user system. The latest release of Java Security 
Model allows fairly easy implementing of extensible access 
controls. 
 
  
Network Access - Without any restriction and security control on a system‟s network 
the system might be subjected to an attack. Though there are 
many different types of network attacks a few of which more 
commonly performed. Secrecy attack category of section 3.1 of 
this paper could be a result of a malicious code getting access to 
the network. 
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 All the socket operations are managed by the Security Manager of 
the Java Security Model. It controls all access to operating system 
and processes. Security Manager has check methods like 
checkConnect ( ) and checkAccept ( ) for both creating and 
accepting of the sockets. Thus, by default security mode untrusted 
applets are not allowed to make network connections except to 
the host from which they were downloaded. It is important to 
remember that allowing access controls are flexible methods in 
Java Security Model. 
 
 
System Properties - Applets are not allowed to access any sensitive properties of the 
system such as user account name or the current working 
directory. Despite many restrictions on applets, they can access or 
read specific set of system properties like the operating-system 
name and Java version number.  
 
 
Input Devices - An applet can only access the keystrokes or mouse clicks of the 
user when the applet's window has been selected. Currently other 
input devices are not supported, although one would assume that 
any access to devices such as camera's or microphones would be 
through a Java library which could add security checks. Currently 
there are no explicit security checks involving input. (Joseph A. 
Bank, quoted 03.03.2010) 
 
 
After analysis of Java security mechanism for controlling system resources of a host machine, 
it would be necessary to look at the adequacy of Java Security Model against malicious threads 
mentioned in section 3.1. 
 
 
Integrity attacks -  Java Sandbox approach is an important approach in preventing 
integrity violations. Access Control capabilities provided by Java 
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Security Model can easily prevents each of integrity attacks 
mentioned in section 3.1.  
 
In the past some flaws in Java enabled browsers had been 
reported:  attack applets gaining full access to the client system 
resources. All the flaws have been tested in the labs, but there had 
been no confirmed report of integrity attacks in the real Web 
environment.  In most cases the reason behind the flaw had been 
implementing of some features of Java Security Model in an 
improper way in some versions of Java enabled Web browsers. All 
the flaws were fixed in the next release of those Web browsers.  
 
 
Secrecy attacks -  To prevent confidentiality violations the Java Sandbox approach is 
one of the best approaches. Access Control capabilities provided 
by Java Security Model can easily prevents most of secrecy attack 
mentioned in section 3.1. Restrictions on socket connection to 
other site on the internet by Java Security Manager prevent some 
of the Secrecy Attacks. 
 
 
Availability attacks -  Preventing of availability attacks in a way is much complicated. 
Java does have the ability to place some control on the creation of 
high priority threads (Joseph A. Bank, quoted 05.03.2010). Both 
preventing and not preventing has their side effects. A security 
policy which defines the amount of memory an applet can use will 
not work, because some trusted applet might need more memory 
than defined. Also if a policy prevents creation of more than 10 
windows, this might seem as arbitrary restriction for some users. 
It is interesting to see how availability attack happens. 
  
 
 When Security manager finally give permission to a piece of code 
to access a system resource, the code will get full access privileges 
to the resource.  To what extend the code uses the source is not 
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controlled by Security Manager. Consider if Security manager give 
only write permission to a specific directory for an applet (maybe 
untrusted applet). No mechanism exist to restrict the number of 
files the applet can create in the directory or how big in size a file 
can be or how long it can keep  a file open for writing. The result 
would be denial-of-service which at least forces the victim to 
restart the system. 
 
3.3.1 Integrating Java Sandbox into a Web Browser 
 
To utilize remote codes (applets), a Web Browser with flexible and trustworthy security 
architecture is needed. By allowing the writer of a Web Browser to customize both Security 
Manager and Class Loader the Java Security Architecture has provided a flexible Security 
Architecture. From the original Sandbox model to policy-based model by refining the security 
model, Java has become a flexible and trustworthy Security Architecture. This has made the 
Java Security Model one of the most popular Security Architecture in the World.  
 
By subclassing the Security Manager and certain methods, the developer of a Web Browser 
defines and implements a security policy, and then the new version of the Security Manager 
can be installed as the Browser or System Security Manager. Since the Security policy of a Java 
enabled Web browser is implemented by subclassing the Java Security Manager, it is of 
concern to end users of a Web browser that the Web browser‟s version of the Security 
Manager is implemented correctly.  Thus, implementing of a Web browser‟s Security Manager 
is more critical than implementing of its Class Loader. 
 
It is important to remember that despite being one of the most important components of the 
system, the Security Manager is not installed when the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) starts 
up. Whenever a Java enabled Web Brower encounters an untrusted code, it is the 
responsibility of the Web Browser to install Security Manager before allowing the code to be 
executed, because access to system‟s critical resource is controlled by the Security Manager. In 
case the Security Manager is not installed by the Web browser, while encountering an applet, 
the applet (remote code) will get the same access permissions as the local application or 
trusted codes. 
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Some criticism has been expressed because of the fact that the Java Security Model protects 
the system resources by providing a sandbox for every applet, but the model or Java Virtual 
Machine (JVM) does not protect the Web browser itself from being attack by malicious code. 
The malicious code might interact directly with the Web browser. It means if the malicious 
applet exploits bugs in the Java enabled Web browser, the applet might be able to avoid the 
Java Sandbox mechanisms and gain access to the system resources. In the extreme, the applet 
might replace the original Java Virtual Machine with rogue copy. If this is accomplished by a 
malicious applet, then all the remote codes will be able to gain access to the system resources 
without any restriction of the Java Sandbox. There had been reports and examples of attacks 
that exploit bugs in the Java enabled Web browsers instead of the Java Security Model. Thus, 
this means that the Java Sandbox security mechanisms built into the Java Virtual Machine is 
avoidable if the Java enabled Web browser is not bug free. 
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4  Conclusions 
 
 
In this chapter, based upon the analysis derived in the pervious chapter, I will present the 
findings and conclusion. Findings will be presented in a general discussion and research 
questions. Then at the end of this chapter I will draw conclusion.  
 
4.1 General Discussion 
 
Despite Java and Java applets has increased security risks to the connected global Internet for 
example fraud, identity theft and even fear of users‟ system destruction, then what is the 
reason that Java is still desirable in the first place. There are many reasons behind; one of the 
most important reasons is that in most cases Java users probably finds the Java‟s advantages 
outweigh the risks. But for a system such as military base system where security is of 
paramount importance, it is recommended that it should be completely disconnected from the 
global Internet or has a separate network connected to the global Internet.  Another reason is 
that Java, beside fairly good security, has also provided increased power and flexibility. For 
example Java applets have animated the internet and made the websites more dynamic and 
entertaining. Java applets provide functionalities in a Web browser that can not be perform by 
HTML such as games and chat applications.  Java applet has also brought improvement in 
education systems for example improvement in practices of teaching and learning6. Some 
other advantages of applets include portability, speed, independent of browser, loaded when 
needed and no installation needed.  
 
To restrict security breaches and combat vast numbers of security issues involved with the 
Java applets some of which is mentioned in the preceding paragraph and section 3.1 of this 
paper, Java has provided a security model with access controller, easily configurable security 
policy and easily extensible access control structure. Java has named the security model as 
Sandbox, a model which allows the users to take advantages of ad-hoc applications while it 
surrounds the running application to protect users‟ system from malicious codes. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Java Applets in Education, URL: http://www.irt.org/articles/js151/index.htm, quoted 10.03.2010 
  
 
47 
 
 The Java Security Model might not prevent some (minor things from my point of view) 
annoying behaviours or annoyance attacks for instance an applet may be able to play loud 
sound, reload page in new window, display something users don‟t like to look at and etc, but it 
is unable to steal users confidential information which it the most important thing from a 
privacy and system security point of view. 
 
4.2 Research Questions 
 
The main objective of this research (to summarize the research questions) has been to 
research, study and present the security edges (security advantages over others), important 
features and benefits of the Java sandbox model. 
 
The findings reveal that Java applet does increase the security risks and the developers knew 
for well the risks, therefore they have provided the Sandbox model, a fairly well security 
mechanisms to protect users‟ confidential information from stealing, deleting, modifying and 
any other destructive external threads. 
 
It is also revealed that some criticism has been expressed about the risks involved with the 
Java applets. But if we consider our normal life (by normal life I mean, no computer systems) 
situations, when benefits of something outweigh the risks of it people normally take the risks, 
that‟s what the Java developers did. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
For the sake of a system security both the Web browser and the Java Security Model into the 
Web browser must be implemented properly. A bug in either of these can result a security 
hole that malicious code could exploit. For the Java Sandbox security mechanisms to work 
properly there many important points to be taken in consideration such as: 
 
 The Web browser should be bug-free so that it can resist all attacks 
 
 The Class Loader of the Java Sandbox should put all the codes into the right name 
spaces so that the untrusted codes cannot interact with each other  
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 The Class Loader should prevent interfering of the untrusted code with the trusted 
codes. 
 The bytecode verifier should ensure that the bytecode follows the security rules set by 
Java specification  
 
 The bytecode verifier should ensure that the code passed to the Java interpreter can be 
run without fear of breaking the Java interpreter. 
 
 The Java API (Application Programming Interface) should refer to Security Manager 
in order to enforce the custom security policy by asking the Security Manager for 
permission before it takes any action that might be potentially unsafe 
 
Lack of co-operation or very little co-operation between Web browser developers is a reason 
behind the flaws found in the Java enabled Web browsers. Flaws found in the Java enabled 
Web browsers were either because of implementation error or flaw in the Web browser itself 
not in the Java Sandbox Model. The result of some security organizations that had tested Java 
enabled Web browsers in the past had showed that a flaw found in one browser but not in the 
other because different Java enabled Web browsers treat threads differently.  Personally, I 
think moving towards open source would be one of fairly good solutions to these kinds of 
problems. 
  
I would personally recommend co-operation between Web browsers developers and some 
Internet security organizations for instance Princeton Secure Internet Programming team. The 
flaws found and solutions provided by these security organizations should be taken in 
consideration for the future versions of the Web browsers. 
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